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Silver-lining Africa in 2011
In January 2011, I gave my inaugural address as professor of 
African development at this University and as director of the 
African Studies Centre in Leiden.2 It was meant to provoke 
and it did. It was called ‘Silverlining Africa’ and given at a 
moment in history when Africa’s economies were booming, 
but journalism and public opinion in Europe was still full of 
doom and gloom. Talking about Africa often meant talking 
about a continent of hunger, disease, war and violence, about 
development assistance that was either seen as a waste of 
money, as a drop in the ocean, or as a source of subsidies 
for corrupt leaders and their wealthy lifestyles who couldn’t 
care less about the dire poverty surrounding them. In my 
inaugural address, I tried to show a much more positive and a 
more nuanced picture.3 This was partly based on participatory 
research in Ghana and Burkina Faso,4 where local people 
discussed the many changes during their lifetime and reported 
lots of improvements compared to the lives of their parents and 
grandparents decades earlier. But they also shared their worries 
about growing pressure on natural resources and about the 
impact of resource and identity conflicts. I introduced macro-
level data about Africa’s agricultural development, showing 
that food production had kept pace with rapid population 
growth since the 1950s. Indeed, when I was born, Africa had 
230 million inhabitants. By the time I delivered my speech in 
2011 it was more than a billion and, today, Africa’s population 
stands at 1 billion, 254 million inhabitants.5 I showed that 
Africa’s average life expectancy had improved a lot since 1960, 
from less than forty years to currently more than sixty years 
of age6; and in eight African countries today people die, on 
average, when they are more than 70 years old, which comes 
close to figures for Europe. Adult literacy rates have also greatly 
improved and recently the African Studies Centre and ICLON 
published a thematic map on the occasion of a conference 
about education in Africa by the Netherlands Association of 
African Studies.7 The thematic map is one of the hand-outs 
you will have found on your chairs: it shows (on the second 
page) that the adult literacy rate, the number of adult men and 
women who can read and write, has reached majority levels in 
most African countries and on the first page it also shows that 
the majority of boys and girls are currently going to school. 
Yes, compared to almost everywhere else Africa is trailing 
behind and this is particularly true for men and particularly 
women who live in a belt that stretches from Mauritania to 
Somalia. And yes, numbers do often conceal the low quality 
of that education. However, the education situation in 2011 is 
so much better than the situation in 1960 and since 2011 the 
situation has further improved. In many parts of Africa young 
people today aspire to go to secondary school and the number 
of university students has recently exploded. Parents and other 
family members are prepared to invest a considerable part of 
their often meagre earnings in the education of their children. 
And with an enormous increase in smart phones and internet 
reach, many Africans now have access to the same overloads of 
information as we do.8 
In 2011, I talked about the major economic and political 
changes since 1960 and I mentioned the many countries with 
considerable economic growth figures during the first decade 
of this century. 
After boom came bust
To show what has happened subsequently, I would like to use 
ice cream imports as a metaphor. See the thematic map about 
international trade. In 2001, Africa only imported a little bit of 
ice cream, with a total value of a mere 9 million US dollars. By 
2011, this had increased fivefold to 46 million. And it would 
continue to increase to almost 70 million in 2014. And then 
the ice cream extravaganza began to melt: falling to 62 million 
in 2015 and 50 million in 2016. It is a telling metaphor. First, 
it shows that consumption of what can be called luxury food 
items by a growing middle class had increased greatly in those 
years of Africa’s economic boom. As you see from the picture, 
even a political leader like former President Obasanjo enjoys it 
a lot. Apparently, Africa’s infrastructure of ports, supermarkets 
and ice cream vendors has reached levels of sophistication 
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where fridges and transport with cooling function well. It also 
shows that the growth was very much over by 2015 and 2016: 
after boom came bust. And, of course, one wonders: ice cream 
imports? Can’t Africa produce ice cream itself? The interesting 
fact is that part of Africa does: in particular, South Africa 
exports a lot of ice cream to other parts of the continent. But 
a lot of imported ice cream comes and came from Southern 
Europe. For Africa’s number one economic tycoon, Nigerian 
entrepreneur Aliko Dangote,9 ice cream was one of the reasons 
that he started investing massively in Africa’s food industry.10 
Let us look at the economic and social performance in Africa 
between 2001 and 2016. The first page of the info-sheet about 
Africa in the 21st Century, which is also in your possession, 
shows the average changes in the real values of gross domestic 
product per person for all African countries and it shows the 
changes in the so-called human development index, which 
measures levels of education and life expectancy in addition 
to economic performance and hence is a more comprehensive 
indicator of development levels.11 For the economy the figures 
are very convincing12: most African economies experienced 
a boom, with 60 per cent higher real income levels in 
2016 compared to 2001. The social improvements are less 
convincing: Africa’s average Human Development Index only 
increased from 500 points out of 1000, to 530. In fact, 17 of 
Africa’s 54 countries showed a deteriorating situation. Indeed, 
while it was party time for Africa’s business and political 
elites as well as foreign investors, maybe only 20 or 30 per 
cent of Africa’s people really benefitted. Africa’s growth has 
been highly inequitable and public investments in education, 
healthcare, water provision, agricultural services and other 
infrastructure often lagged far behind the expansion of the 
economy, particularly where that economy was dominated by 
oil, gas and mining.
 
Africa’s international trade
If we look at the thematic map about Africa’s international 
trade again, it becomes clear how dominant the exports of 
oil, gas and mining have always been for the continent as a 
whole. But the graphs about trade dynamics also show how 
Africa’s exports and imports increased tremendously between 
2001 and 2012/2013. For exports of products it was an almost 
sixfold growth and for imports a growth of almost five times. 
Indeed, Africa was clearly emerging as an economic player of 
growing importance during those boom years.13 Export and 
import figures also show how dramatic the economic bust 
has been during the last two years. For products and services 
together the year 2016 had 40 per cent less export value than in 
the peak year of 2012 and 25 per cent less import value than in 
the peak year 2013. As a result of lagging import adjustments, 
Africa as a whole currently faces a trade deficit of close to 30 
per cent, which is already creating huge problems for many 
African economies and governments. Finally, this first page of 
the thematic map about African international trade statistics 
also shows the geo-political shift that took place between 2001 
and 2016. The United States of America has lost its prominence 
as the most important destination for Africa’s exports to China, 
while India has become very important too. France lost its pole 
position to China as provider of Africa’s imported produce, 
while the USA dropped to fourth. 
Growing worries again
Was I right to highlight Africa’s positive performance during 
the first decade of this century in my inaugural lecture? I still 
think I was. Can we still talk about a silver-lining Africa now, 
almost seven years later? I think we can. That said, I certainly 
don’t want to give the impression that everything is bright and 
shining. Economically, since the end of 2014, there have been 
genuine reasons for worry again and socially and politically 
much of Africa has become more dangerous again. For the 
second time the African Studies Centre Leiden has published 
a thematic map about the security situation in Africa. The first 
time was at the height of the ebola epidemic in 2014, when 
a University of Applied Sciences in the Netherlands was so 
worried about their students’ chances of survival in Africa that 
they announced a ban on students travelling to anywhere in 
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Africa and we responded with our first no-go area map on the 
basis of travel advice given by our Ministry of Foreign Affairs.14 
To be honest, we were also shocked by the abundance of red 
areas on this map, but of course, Cape Town and Freetown 
were very different places in 2014 so we were happy to help 
bring more nuance to that debate. Looking again at the security 
situation in March 201715 (the map is also in your hands), we 
see that the former ebola areas are accessible again, but that, 
on the whole, more areas in Africa have become no-go areas, 
with dire consequences for inhabitants, but also for researchers 
and students from the region and from elsewhere and hence 
for on-the-ground knowledge about what is going on. On the 
reverse of this map we show the current Fragile State Index of 
the Washington-based think-tank ‘Fund for Peace’.16 Not only 
is that map pretty red as well, but if we compare the ten-year 
changes in the fragility index we see considerable deterioration 
during the last decade. So, despite rapid economic growth 
during the last ten years, the social and political fragility and 
risks have grown. Most of Africa’s population lives in countries 
that have seen a deteriorating security situation during the last 
ten years and a worsening of this situation in the last two years. 
These are very worrying statistics. 
People on the move
Every time there is a security crisis in an area, it produces 
people on the move, in forms of calamity migration towards 
areas that are regarded as more safe. This mobility often 
happens within countries, but also to neighbouring countries 
or to places further away. Currently, 18 per cent of Somalia’s 
population lives abroad, 1 million in neighbouring countries, 
another 200,000 in other parts of Africa, 280,000 somewhere 
in Europe, 260,000 somewhere in Asia and 170,000 in North 
America. For 7 per cent of Eritreans it is the same story and if 
we look at, for instance, Mali and the DRC, we see a million 
Malians on the move and 1.4 million people originating from 
the so-called Democratic Republic of the Congo. And in all 
cases, the majority of these people on the move as a result 
of violence and state breakdown are living in neighbouring 
countries. Other forms of calamity migration are related to the 
effects of severe droughts. 1.3 million people who used to live 
in Burkina Faso nowadays call Côte d’Ivoire their home. 
The migration conundrum
However, not all migration in and from Africa can be 
explained by calamities. Many people are looking for better 
living conditions. Some of it is because of better economic 
prospects elsewhere. More than three million Egyptians have 
left their country to work abroad, mostly in one of the Gulf 
states. Almost 2 million Moroccans have left their country, 
more than 8 per cent of Morocco’s population and most of 
them have come to Europe. Nigeria currently hosts almost a 
million people from elsewhere in Africa. South Africa hosts 
more than 2 million immigrants from all over Africa, but 
also more than half a million who originate from Europe. 
And South Africa is an example of people being attracted to a 
country for lifestyle reasons: as one of the very few gay-tolerant 
countries in Africa, a city like Cape Town hosts many African 
homosexuals from all over the continent. By the way: it is very 
wrong to only talk about refugees or calamity migrants on the 
one hand and economic migrants on the other. Many young 
migrants also want to explore, to see the world, to fall in love. 
They want to escape from conditions at home that restrict their 
creativity or that feel like a prison of old customs that they 
want to escape, at least temporarily. They want to be away from 
the old patriarchs and, in some cases, matriarchs who become 
ever older and who rule countries, counties and families like 
feudal estates. These dinosaurs do not want to hand over 
property and power to the next generation and certainly not 
to the angry youth knocking on their doors.17 Some dinosaurs 
were forced to step down, though, as former Presidents Ben 
Ali of Tunisia, Mubarak of Egypt, Khadaffi of Libya, Wade 
of Senegal, Compaoré of Burkina Faso and Jammeh of the 
Gambia experienced in recent years.
The thematic map about migration shows the evidence of 
African people on the move to other countries. According 
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to migration specialist Prof. Hein de Haas [first Oxford, 
now University of Amsterdam; he was one of my students] 
migration is a result of aspirations and capabilities.18 When 
countries and people have a low development level (as 
measured by the Human Development Index) especially 
young people with social media information about the world 
may have rising aspirations, but low capabilities to actually 
migrate. In a study based on global data about international 
migration, Hein de Haas has shown that higher Human 
Development Index levels initially go hand in hand with much 
higher emigration levels, while immigration levels are only 
rising slowly at first. Only at high Human Development Index 
levels do countries become net importers of migrants (see the 
map at the beginning of this booklet). If the same is true for 
Africa, Africa’s relatively fast development during the last two 
decades must have resulted in rising migration levels and if 
Africa continues to develop economically and socially, this will 
result in MORE international migration, not less, until Africa 
has reached high Human Development Levels. Indeed, Africa’s 
total emigration increased from 22 million in 2000 to 33 
million in 2015, an increase of 51 per cent, above the increase 
in population numbers.19 And indeed, immigration levels still 
lag behind (from 15 million to 20 million, an increase of only 
35 per cent20). 
More development is more migration
The latest revision by the United Nations’ Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs (Population Division) has been 
used here to check the evidence for 2015.21 As I said before, in 
2015, 33 million Africans were living outside their countries of 
birth, but 16.4 million of those international migrants migrated 
to other countries within Africa. Of the 16.2 million Africans 
living outside Africa, 9 million have gone to Europe, 5 million 
to Asia and Oceania and 2 million to the Americas. However, 
migration within Africa was largely a result of turmoil and 
calamities and that distorts the picture significantly. If we look 
at intercontinental migration, Hein de Haas’s theory is very 
much confirmed, although at a lower level than his global 
calculations of 2010. Africa’s intercontinental migration has 
only started and the world better gets used to it!
The two maps on the first page of the thematic map about 
migration show the numbers and relative importance of Africa’s 
intercontinental emigration. For the African countries at a 
relatively high level of human development, Mauritius, the 
Seychelles and Algeria, the weighted average of intercontinental 
migration is more than 4.5 per cent. For countries with 
low to medium values on the human development index, 
like South Africa, Egypt, or Ghana, the weighted average of 
intercontinental migration is 3 per cent. For countries with 
a low value on the human development index, currently the 
majority of African countries and people, the weighted average 
of intercontinental migration is only 0.7 per cent.22 Let us 
suppose that African countries currently with low scores for 
human development go up one step on the staircase of human 
development, up to the low to medium level, only step two out 
of five. Then we can predict that intercontinental migration 
levels would increase from less than one per cent to what looks 
like the norm of three per cent. In terms of people on the move 
to Europe, Asia and the Americas this would mean a substantial 
increase in the numbers of intercontinental migrants coming 
from Africa. If Africa’s population rises to 1.7 billion by 2030 
and at the same time the Sustainable Development Goals are 
achieved and most of Africa has reached the second tier of the 
human development index, then we can predict that Africa’s 
intercontinental migration will have reached 50 million people 
instead of the current 16 million at that point. I will deal with 
these future prospects shortly. But does this mean that Europe 
should prevent Africa from developing to higher levels of 
human development in order to avoid massive migration, like 
Europe did during most of the colonial period: keep them 
poor, rural and uneducated? This is a political position that 
can sometimes be heard and read in social media connected 
to the extreme right wing of Europe’s and America’s political 
spectrum. It will not surprise you that my political position is 
different and, as a scientist, I say: politicians should first and 
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foremost be realistic and should avoid saying things that might 
win them votes in the short run, but are counterproductive 
in the long term, as many voters will be clever enough to 
differentiate reality from nonsense. 
But let me first go back to where I started. This intercontinental 
migration is only a tiny part of what is going on in terms of 
geographical mobility. An overwhelming number of Africans 
are on the move in their own countries and within the 
continent. It is an intertwined mixture of calamities caused by 
nature, war and oppression, economic motives, social desires 
and a quest for adventure, love and more freedom to live the 
lives they would like to live. 
Destination Africa
Before further speculating about the future, let me also look at 
the other side of the coin of intercontinental migration: Africa 
as a destination. The vast majority of Africa’s international 
migrants are people from Africa itself: 14 million coming from 
neighbouring countries, close to 3 million from other parts of 
Africa and only two and a half million coming from outside 
Africa. Within Africa, five countries stand out as receiving 
hubs for African and intercontinental migration: South Africa, 
Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria, Kenya and Ethiopia. Europe no longer 
provides the majority of intercontinental migrants to Africa. 
Currently, that is Asia, if we include the Asian part of the 
Middle East: with almost half of those from Palestine, more 
than 100,000 migrants from India and close to that same 
number from Iraq, followed by countries like Saudi Arabia, 
China, Lebanon and Jordan. And indeed, the figures reported 
for China are far below the wild stories in the media. It is also 
good to highlight the fact that most Middle Eastern migrants 
go to Libya, Egypt and Algeria, while most European migrants 
go to South Africa. In fact, four out of ten intercontinental 
migrants to Africa went to North Africa and three out of ten 
to South Africa. Among the Europeans who lived and worked 
in Africa in 2015 the United Kingdom leads, with 360,000 
immigrants in 2015, followed by France, Portugal, Germany 
and Italy.23 The Netherlands is in sixth place, with 26,000 
people in Africa, of which 22,000 are in South Africa. 
Of course, many more people from Europe and from elsewhere 
visit Africa each year for business and tourism. The latest 
figures available on a website about African tourism shows a 
total of 45 million international visitors to Africa in 2014,24 
who together spent more than 55 billion US dollars on the 
continent.25 By the way, this also shows that the African 
economy has been booming during the last fifteen years. In 
the year 2000, international tourists only spent 16 billion US 
dollars.26 Tourist income has more than tripled. And if we’re 
talking about money flows related to people’s geographical 
mobility we should also talk about the importance of migrant 
remittances. According to the KNOMAD programme related 
to the World Bank,27 the Global Partnership on Migration and 
Development, preliminary figures for 2015 show that Africa 
as a whole received close to 65 billion dollars in remittance 
income. Nigeria and Egypt were the most important 
recipients.28 But in terms of relative importance, remittances 
have become a lifeline for small countries like Liberia, the 
Comoros islands, or the Gambia, where remittance income has 
become more than one-fifth of total income and certainly for 
Somaliland, where it is more than half.29 Many governments in 
Africa recognize the importance of this flow of money. They 
also see the importance for their government budgets, for 
contributions to local development projects and for bringing 
in investments from abroad, often linked with innovative ideas 
about economy and society. Many African governments would 
be very reluctant to curb this stream of blessings and hope. 
Some governments even openly encourage their youth to go 
abroad and send remittances back home. 
Africa in 2100
Let me now turn to the future. In the info-sheet about Africa in 
2100, the second page shows that Africa has been experiencing 
very rapid population growth since about 1950 and this 
growth will continue in the 21st century. Table 1 presents the 
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long-term population data and prospects and compares those 
with Europe. According to the medium-level predictions 
of the population specialists of the United Nations, Africa’s 
population will have grown from the current 1.2 billion people 
to more than 4.4 billion by the end of this century and Africa’s 
urban population from the current half billion to 3 billion. 
The reason for this continued growth is the fact that Africa’s 
demographic transition started later than elsewhere and from 
higher levels. It is also slower than elsewhere. The figure about 
the demographic transition, comparing all continents and 
showing the evidence and trends of fertility levels between 
1950 and 2100, is a figure that I would recommend you to 
make the opening page on your mobile, laptop or desktop 
and also make a print of it and put it somewhere you can 
see it every day. This figure says it all. And make no mistake: 
Africa’s women are currently having less children than their 
mothers did. But even if Africa’s women decided to have only 
two children, the sheer number of girls and young women 
living today will result in a massive population growth in 
the next few decades. Africa has the youngest population on 
earth, with a median age around 20 and in some countries it is 
as low as 17. And soon, the majority of these youngsters will 
live in cities, ever bigger cities. Africa currently has 55 cities 
with more than one million inhabitants and its ‘megacities’, 
cities with more than 10 million inhabitants, are increasing 
as well. According to a study quoted in the info-sheet,30 six 
of the world’s 41 megacities will be in Africa in 2030: Lagos, 
Cairo, Johannesburg, Kinshasa/Brazzaville, Luanda and Dar es 
Salaam. See map 3 on the info-sheet. Lagos will even become 
part of a super-megacity, one big urban coastal belt stretching 
from Abidjan up to Lagos, via Accra, Lomé and Cotonou. 
Currently, that city belt already has 33 million inhabitants.31 In 
2030, this Afro-Atlantic City might have more than 50 million 
inhabitants and by the end of the century one can expect an 
urban agglomeration that can be compared with Jing-Jin-Ji, the 
current city belt in Northern China that connects Beijing with 
Tianjin, which is expected to have 130 million inhabitants.32 
Four billion Africans in 2100 and most of them in cities, with 
hundreds of millions in megacities creates a few challenges for 
Africa and for the world. But it also creates opportunities. Let 
me first deal with the challenges, so that I can devote the last 
part of my speech to more positive matters, so that you can 
enjoy the drinks afterwards with a glimmer of hope. 
The challenges
The need for goods and services by four billion Africans means 
at least a tripling of demand and particularly for food, water, 
shelter and energy. Most of the demand will come from urban 
centres,33 and this will put increasing pressure on land and 
water and on natural resources, within Africa as well as on 
the world beyond Africa. It will certainly mean threats to the 
remaining forests and wildlife. And it will mean threats to the 
tourism sector.34 It is right to fear that expanding demand will 
be at the expense of nature, biodiversity and climate stability. 
What’s more, climate change scenarios show that, with the 
exception of East Africa, most of Africa will have to cope with 
increased risk of drought.35 And like everywhere else, Africa’s 
coasts will experience more storms and damage from rising 
sea levels. Many of Africa’s poorest urban people will live in 
the most vulnerable areas along the coasts, which are highly 
prone to flood risks and some scholars predict massive climate 
change-related calamity migration every time a drought, floods 
or storms hit an area. 
However, perhaps an even greater threat is the increased 
chance of violent conflicts over natural resources and between 
people with different identities. This can be identities related 
to indigenous claims in a particular area, claims of ethnic 
belonging, but also racial issues and religion36 will play a major 
role in violent conflicts, which are partly based on the struggle 
for resources, but not necessarily so.37 
The last fifty years of rapid population growth have shown 
that Africa’s food production has generally kept pace with that 
population growth.38 However, gradually, Africa is also starting 
to import more food. Between 2001 and the last few years, 
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the thematic map about international trade shows a four-to-
fivefold increase in food imports by African countries. In 2010, 
a number of African countries had crossed the 50 per cent line 
in terms of food deficits. On the other hand, there are many 
signs of increasing agricultural productivity in Africa, although 
the levels are still far below those in Asia.39 One might expect 
that the high population growth that Africa will experience 
during the rest of this century will result in further increases in 
food imports, both as primary products and as agro-industrial 
products. And food items are only part of Africa’s increasing 
reliance on the world market for its consumption needs. This 
will create risks for Africa’s balance of trade and balance of 
payments and what is probably also a matter of anxiety in 
some circles are the geo-political risks: we should be mindful 
of the well-known Dutch expression ‘wiens brood men eet, 
diens woord men spreekt’, in English the equivalent is ‘he who 
pays the piper calls the tune’. It is very interesting to see what 
has happened during Africa’s boom years in terms of the 
origin of Africa’s imported food. In 2001, the United States 
was still the dominant source of Africa’s imported cereals. It 
is somewhat surprising that the USA lost that position during 
President Obama’s reign and currently the USA is only in 
sixth place. France has taken over the number one spot, but is 
immediately followed by Russia. And for oils and fats, Malaysia 
leads, for sugars it is Brazil and for meat it is Brazil too. South 
Africa provides most of the import needs of other African 
countries when it comes to vegetables, fruits and beverage. 
Of all food items, cereals are the most politically vulnerable, 
particularly in countries where cereal products like bread and 
maizemeal are subsidized by the government and where rising 
food prices often result in urban riots. The maps on the second 
page of the thematic map about Africa’s international trade 
show the shifts in the most important cereal providers and this 
tells a story. Climate change scenarios show that the world’s 
most important cereal food basket, America’s Midwest, will be 
one of the major victims of the growing risk of drought, while 
Russia will be the most likely winner of the climate gamble. 
Not only will Russia’s potential cereal production area move 
northwards, predictions are that those areas will also receive 
more rain. In the long run, the big geo-political question will 
be: will China be the dominant buyer, or even producer of that 
cereal expansion in Russia, or will there be enough negotiation 
strength in Africa to get a share of the deal? I would say that, 
in general, Africa’s wisest strategy would be to avoid this 
dependence on volatile and dangerous world markets for 
strategic goods like cereals. Africa would be wise to produce its 
own food, but with intra-African trade relations on a regional 
or even continental scale. If not, the risks of urban food revolts 
will continuously undermine political stability. This may fuel 
political opposition, eager to use Africa’s urban angry and 
impatient youth as its vanguards. Africa’s youth also demands 
more employment and particularly more decent employment,40 
and less inequality in terms of chances to improve one’s life. 
And many young people have lost - and continue to lose 
- faith in Africa’s failing political leadership. In response, 
many leaders have become harsh in their use of power and 
violence and in years to come one may fear that a further 
militarization may take place in Africa’s urban centres and in 
those parts of the rural areas that produce crucial products, 
like minerals, agricultural exports and increasingly also green 
forms of energy. And it is quite likely that the cycles of violence 
in Africa’s marginal peripheries will continue, occasionally 
spilling over into urban hotspots of turmoil.
The opportunities
So these are the risks and the challenges and it will be clear 
that some of the risks may spill over to Europe, particularly in 
the form of calamity migration and in the form of exporting 
radical forms of hatred against those who are regarded as 
enemies and against those who are seen as responsible for 
Africa’s predicament, due to slavery, colonialism, racism 
and exploitation. The current demands in South Africa and 
elsewhere to decolonize the mind and for instance also to 
decolonize academia and North-Atlantic dominance, certainly 
also has elements of anti-European and anti-white sentiments 
and reversed racism. 
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But let us now turn to the opportunities and to the bright side 
of Africa’s future. As we have seen before, population growth 
and urbanization will result in a major growth in demand for 
all types of products. Those will overwhelmingly come from 
the hinterlands of the expanding cities in Africa itself. And 
that will trigger further economic transformation in those 
hinterlands. This will include rapid agricultural expansion 
in terms of area, volumes and productivity, Africa’s ‘green 
evolution’. In East Africa, there will be an additional gain; 
reaping the benefits of climate change-driven improvements 
in rainfall in an area that already shows signs of major 
innovations. 
When economists talk about the impact of population growth 
they talk about demographic dividend. A predominance of 
young, energetic people, who have gone to school and know 
how to use social media, will create innovations in production 
and lifestyles. This information revolution will continue. 
Africa’s well-informed youth will formulate political demands 
for better lives and more equal opportunities. There will also 
be more remittances as a result of increasing migration and 
some of those remittances will come with innovative ideas and 
examples from elsewhere. We have seen before that Africa is 
already experiencing a fast demographic transition. African 
mothers in my age cohort had close to seven children. Young 
African girls will now have an average of four children during 
their lifetime. By 2050, it is predicted that this will have fallen 
to three children per woman and in 2100 Africa’s fertility 
levels will have plateaued, with two children per woman. 
However, a lot will depend on the speed of urbanization, on 
the trust in social security provision,41 and most of all on 
the number of girls who will receive secondary education. 
Part of the innovation occurring in Africa involves parents 
investing in the quality of the lives and life chances of their 
children and they are no longer focused on having big families. 
Among urban, well-educated and well-connected parents, 
two or three children has already become the norm. However, 
Africa is also experiencing zealous religious campaigns 
against fertility reduction and political-religious resistance 
to talking about population policies. And don’t be fooled by 
media overexposure of what happens in Islamic societies in 
Africa. The same zeal can be found among Pentecostal42 and 
Catholic circles and it is also very useful to understand more 
about African religious ideas about morality and evil in their 
indigenous religious practices.43 
But let’s go back to the positive prospects. The growing 
connectivity of Africa’s economy and information technology 
is also fuelling regional integration and one may expect a 
growing importance of the African Union and of regional 
agencies.44 Recent strategy papers by, for instance, the African 
Union and the African Development Bank, like “Agenda 2063; 
The Africa We Want” show much vision and optimism and 
I think these visions and plans will be more than just rituals. 
The emerging class of African entrepreneurs goes beyond 
individual country boundaries. We can see the start of African-
owned multinationals, active in many African economies and 
they are getting used to dealing with different political elites in 
the continent. Together with foreign investors, these African 
business and political elites are expanding their investments in 
infrastructure and trying to align their strategies to make them 
regional or even continental. And part of these investments 
now takes the form of rapid development of green energy 
solutions: wind farms, like the huge project in Northern Kenya 
that is almost completed, or the mega-investment in Morocco’s 
solar projects in the deserts, but also investments in geo-
thermal energy along the Great Rift Valley. Some of Africa’s 
political and business leadership is currently leapfrogging to 
green energy and to the next levels of information technology. 
Many observers note that the move away from cables and 
physical networks to point-based energy and information 
solutions is particularly suited to Africa. 
We can also expect major industrialization, partly based on 
these advances in energy and information technology. African 
consumption of industrial products will grow significantly 
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and will become much more based on African production, 
although probably with huge investment by Asian, but also 
European and American investors, including the African 
diaspora.45 And some of Africa’s business leaders are rapidly 
expanding their investments in all types of industries and 
in industry-oriented services.46 We are also seeing a major 
expansion of the entertainment industry and this is expected 
to grow, with Nollywood’s film industry in Nigeria and the 
activities of the many Pentecostal churches all over Christian 
Africa, two sides of that same coin. It is also noticeable that 
many African leaders are using ever bolder statements about 
the need to build an African economy and the need to form 
urban growth coalitions where entrepreneurs, political leaders, 
academics and civil society work together towards shared 
economic and social goals.47 One also hears demands for more 
and better protection of Africa’s next generation of industries 
and services and pleas for so-called frugal innovation on 
a massive scale.48 And the current era of protectionism, 
spearheaded by Brexit and by Trump’s election, is fuelling 
protectionist policies in Africa as well. 
That’s why we need an African Studies Centre!
Of course the future is uncertain and Africa’s future will 
depend on the complex outcome of the risks and opportunities 
that I have just sketched. To be aware of what is going on 
in Africa and what that might mean for Europe and for 
the Netherlands as a tiny part of global society, we need an 
African Studies Centre. In the Netherlands we can be proud 
of the strength and quality of the African Studies Centre in 
Leiden, an important hub for the Africa-Europe Group for 
Interdisciplinary Studies, AEGIS49 and well connected to 
relevant scholarship in Africa50 and across the globe. And 
although I have highlighted the recent past and the future 
for Africa, let me end this speech by saying that we cannot 
understand what is currently going on in Africa and what 
will happen during the rest of this century, if we do not study 
Africa’s past and the history of Africa’s relationships with the 
world. Many young Africans are demanding a rewriting of that 
history, for so long dominated by the language of the global 
and national political winners.51 Decolonizing the minds 
will also mean a massive and bottom-up re-interpretation of 
Africa’s history and connectivity and it also means connecting 
the academic world with the worlds of activists and artists.52 
This work will mainly be done in Africa itself. But scholars 
working in Europe, including those in the African diaspora, 
will play an important part too.53 It has been and it will 
be an adventurous journey. And I gladly hand over my 
responsibilities for the African Studies Centre Leiden to a 
historian, Professor Jan-Bart Gewald!54
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